Thursday, October 3, 2019

Hart, Fuller and Devlin Theories of Law and Morality

Hart, Fuller and Devlin Theories of Law and Morality Introduction This essay will explore the theories of Hart, Fuller and Devlin and consider there views on the link between law and morality. It will consider the debates mounted between Hart and Fuller and Hart and Devlin and what these debates add to our understanding to the link between law and morality. It will be argued and concluded that morality plays an important and essential role in our understanding of our legal responsibilities. It will recognise that there has been a long association between morality and law and that traditionally law has been associated with religions, customs and divinity. The Hart – Fuller Debate To understand Hart’s criticism of Fuller it is important to familiarise and understand the eight principles of the â€Å"inner morality† of the law that Fuller asserts and how in his view law and morality are intertwined. Fuller asserts that: A legal system must be base on or reveal some kind of regular tends. As such law should be founded on generalisations of conduct such as rules, rather than simply following arbitrary adjudication. Laws must be publicised so that subjects know how they are supposed to behave. Rules will not have the desired effect if it is likely that your present actions will not be judged by them in future. As such, retrospective legislation should not be abused. Laws should be comprehensible, even if it is only lawyers who understand them Laws should not be contradictory. Laws should not expect the subject to perform the impossible. Law should not change so frequently that the subject cannot orient his actions to it There should not be a significant difference between the actual administration of the law and what the written rules say These criteria are in the form of moral rules of duty. Fuller expresses them as principles or goals; generality of laws; promulgation of laws; minimising the use of retrospective laws; clarity; lack of contradiction; possibility of obedience, constancy through time; consistency between the words and practice of law[1]. Hart’s criticism of Fuller’s eight principles of â€Å"inner morality† of law must be understood. These principles, which loosely describe requirements of procedural justice, were claimed by Fuller to ensure that a legal system would satisfy the demand of morality, to the extent that a legal system which adhered to all of the principles would explain the all-important idea of â€Å"fidelity to law† In other words, such a legal system would command obedience with moral justification. Fuller’s key idea is that evil aims lack a â€Å"logic† and coherence that moral aims have. Thus, paying attention to the â€Å"coherence† of the laws ensures their morality. The argument is unfortunate because it does, of course, claim too much. Hart’s criticism is that we could, equally, have eight principles of the â€Å"inner morality† of the poisoner’s art. Or we can improvise further[2]. We can talk of the principles of the inner morality of Nazism, for example, or the principles of the inner morality of chess. Fuller’s explanation of the Nazi regime is insufficient and flawed, and we must take on Hart’s analysis. Fuller argues that the Nazi regime was so intrinsically evil that it could not be law, this it is argued, is not a sufficient conclusion. The point is that the idea of principles in themselves with the attendant explanation at a general level of what is to be achieved and consistency is insufficient to establish the moral nature of such practices. This was that there is an important sense of legal justification that claims made in the name of law are morally serious. At the least, the person who makes a genuine claim for legal justification of an immoral, Nazi-type legal system must believe that there is some moral force to his claim. Against Fuller, Hart insisted that the identification of a directive as law indicated nothing about the moral authority of that directive and thus nothing about whether that directive should be obeyed[3]. Consequently, claimed Hart, official and citizen disobedience to immoral directives would be facilitated not by pretending that such directives failed to qualify as legal just because of their perceived iniquity, but rather by internalising the fundamental positivist insight that law and morality were conceptually distinct. Because of this conceptual distinction between law and morality, Hart argued, a directives legality said nothing about its morality[4] The Hart- Devlin Debate Again, it is important at the outside to understand Devlin’s approach to law and morality, before considering Hart’s criticism of his approach. In â€Å"The Enforcement of Morals[5]† Devlin supported the view that law should not tolerate that which the reasonable man finds disgusting. Society needs a moral identity, because it is the moral values of society that make it cohere. For Devlin, even private acts of immorality can weaken the fabric of society if they are sufficiently grave. The balance that Devlin seeks to achieve is placed in the context of the political morality of contemporary society, where toleration is itself a prime moral principle. Thus there â€Å"Must be toleration of the maximum individual freedom that is consistent with the integrity of society[6]†. Devlin’s justification for the legal enforcement of morality is an extension of the harm principle to a perceived threat to society, rather than harm to other individuals. This seems quite a reasonable proposition. However this test is one that masquerades as (1) a relevant test for the principle and (2) an objective test. Devlin’s reasonable man is not asked in sociological terms what immorality is actually threatening to society. He is asked, instead, what he feels disgust at. Further he asserts that whilst the reasonable man test is employed as a way of alienating a courtroom issue from the subjective opinions of parties to a particular legal issue, it does not necessarily have the same effect in this situation. Devlin employs the term reasonable man to give the impression of objectivity. However it is a fiction to suggest that there is a reasonable man when it comes to difficult moral issues. The reasonable man of legal fiction is one who employs practical reason and due consideration when acting. However, all the practical reason and due consideration in the world will not change the preferences an prejudices that embody disgust. On the issue of homosexuality, many people intellectually feel that people’s sexual orientation is not a matter for legal intervention, but they nonetheless find homosexual acts to be repellent. The reasonable man test is thus a spurious validation for prevailing societal aesthetics, rather than a test of what society fe els to be threatening[7]. Devlin’s view should be contrasted with the view of Hart. In Law, Liberty and Morality[8], Hart recognises that there does not seem to be any real widely shared morality, and there can be no freedom if we are compelled to accept only those things that others approve of. Hart notes that there are certain constants of the human condition, which he terms the minimum content of natural law, such as the vulnerability of human beings. If we disregard these sociological facts it would be tantamount to suicide. But beyond these facts, society is faced with a choice of what rules to adopt in order to protect us from the frailties of the human condition[9]. Hart seems to assert that since the development of a society is a collective odyssey, the values that a society has adopted for its preservation and progress constitute a shared morality of sorts. This does not mean that the norms that a society has accepted and retained are ones that are logically necessary for the achievement of social preservation. However, they are instrumental in the maintenance of social cohesion. For this reason he would not accept Devlin’s analogy of deviation from moral norms with treason against society[10]. It may be that a change in morality can result in friction, but i t need not result in the collapse of society. Hart also adopts the harm principle, but denies that consent can be used as a mitigating factor. Equally, immoral acts in public may be harmful to others and, as such, open to legal censure, whereas acts in private should not be a matter for the law. His justification is that while the first is the legitimate prevention of harm, the latter is the enforcement of the societal will over the individual. Hart finds paternalism justified, but not enforce morality per se. Conclusion These theories forwarded create good arguments both for and against the inclusion of morality in law. A more complex case for the non-separation of laws and morals have been made more recently by Detmold: â€Å"Hart’s mistake†¦. Was to try to run two incompatible analyses together; the analysis of sociological statements, where existence can be separated from bindingness and thus from moral statements; and the analysis of internal normative statements, where it cannot. The Concept of Law suffers throughout from a failure to separate these things[11]† This is a true anylasis of Hart’s theories, and it was said at the introduction that it would be concluded that morality was a necessary part of the law and indeed it was important in helping society to understand its moral obligations, this is concluded. However it is difficulty to reach these conclusions, when the definition of morality is considered, it is such an abstract concept is it even possible to pin it down to a definition? It suffices to say that there is no requirement to look outside information or reason in order to find and answer to some moral dilemmas. Often moral feelings run against he grain of other people’s views and even our own reasoning. As such, morals defined in this way are capable of producing infinite disagreement, since different people’s consciences dictate different things. Considering morals in this light suggests that there is absence of universal agreement, if this is the case, how can they effect our understanding of our legal obligations? This would mean that the legal obligations of one person are not necessarily that of another person, this said it follows that what is legally wrong finds its basis somewhere and it is suggested that this base is morality. Although it should be recognised that no all laws are moral- this means that our understanding of the legal/moral argument whilst added to by the debates of Hart, Devlin and Fuller, is not concluded, and it is unlikely that it ever will be. Bibliography Journal Articles Curzon L, (1992) â€Å"Jurisprudence: The Hart-Fuller Debate† Student Law Review 1992 6 (Sum) 55-56 Hayry H, (1991) â€Å"Liberalism and Legal Moralism: The Hart-Devlin Debate and Beyond† Ratio Juris 4(2) 202-218 Schauer F, (2005) â€Å"The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julia Dickinson†, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (493) Books Devlin P, (1965) â€Å"The Enforcement of Morals†, Oxford University Press, Oxford Detmold M J, (1984) â€Å"The Unity of Law and Morality: A Refutation of Legal Positivism†, London: Routledge Kegan Paul Doherty M, (2003) â€Å"Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Law†, Third Edition, Old Bailey Press Fuller L, (1969) â€Å"The Morality of Law† Yale (reprinted 2003) H L A Hart, (1963) â€Å"Law, Liberty and Morality†, Oxford University Press, Oxford Lloyd D, (2001) â€Å"Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence†, Seventh Edition, London, Sweet and Maxwell 1 Footnotes [1] See Fuller L, (1969) â€Å"The Morality of Law† Yale (reprinted 2003) [2] See Doherty M, (2003) â€Å"Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Law†, Third Edition, Old Bailey Press [3] See further Curzon L, (1992) â€Å"Jurisprudence: The Hart-Fuller Debate† Student Law Review 1992 6 (Sum) 55-56 [4] Schauer F, (2005) â€Å"The Social Construction of the Concept of Law: A Reply to Julia Dickinson†, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 25 (493) [5] Devlin P, (1965) â€Å"The Enforcement of Morals†, Oxford University Press, Oxford [6] See Devlin P, (1965) â€Å"The Enforcement of Morals†, Oxford University Press, Oxford [7] See See Doherty M, (2003) â€Å"Jurisprudence: The Philosophy of Law†, Third Edition, Old Bailey Press for further discussion on this point [8] H L A Hart, (1963) â€Å"Law, Liberty and Morality†, Oxford University Press, Oxford [9] Lloyd D, (2001) â€Å"Lloyd’s Introduction to Jurisprudence†, Seventh Edition, London, Sweet and Maxwell [10] For further discussion generally see Hayry H, (1991) â€Å"Liberalism and Legal Moralism: The Hart-Devlin Debate and Beyond† Ratio Juris 4(2) 202-218 [11] Detmold M J, (1984) â€Å"The Unity of Law and Morality: A Refutation of Legal Positivism†, London: Routledge Kegan Paul

Wednesday, October 2, 2019

Shopping Tendencies of Men and Women Essay -- Compare Contrast Essays

Shopping Tendencies of Men and Women One of my friends called me asking to pick her up from the store where she was shopping. When I found her inside the store and asked what happened to her, she came up with a story. Her husband and she decided to take one car to do the shopping and arrange some other business in the bank. Her husband came up with a plan that he will drop her in the store and drive to the bank while she will be shopping. They decided that he would pick her up when he will be done with the bank. But an hour later, when he came and found that she was not done with her shopping list yet, he became angry; moreover, his wife had in her shopping cart a set of glasses that were not on her shopping list. After a tirade that she always wastes her time and his money doing shopping, he left the store. Many times after this accident, I noticed that most women and men behave in different way doing their shopping. For example, women stay much longer in the stores than men, buy a lot of small but necessary purchases, such as a kitchen towel or a new pillow case, and try to reduce expenses using coupons, manufacturer’s rebates or buying stuff on sale. In contrary, most men prefer not to bother themselves with coupons and usually buy needed thing right when they find it. They usually avoid a lot of things that are important for women, such as embroidered serviette or plate covered with ornament. As I have done some observation and questioned my friends, I understood that women have different approach toward shopping than men do, at least among my acquaintances. When women shop, they try to buy things that will perfectly fit their style or interior of their house. They are looking for particular color, shape and size of whatever thing they need -- saucepan, chair, or lamp. I believe when woman buys, her first priority is prettiness, or good look. On second place is practical side of the item. In most cases, women choose a dress that makes her slender and shoes that make her taller even if all these things are unpractical and uncomfortable. However, regular man does not pay much attention to how pretty he will look in a new suit; he cares more how comfortable it is. Most men I know are not picky about their cloth and do not spend a lot of time in any store. One of my male friends told me that he usually goes straight to the section where an it... ...ere are number of calories and ingredients indicated, and check price and quality of different brand names. For instance, when I want to buy a melon, I will examine it first: does melon has sweet aroma, is it ripe? I want to buy the best from what is available.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Indeed a lot of fellow females will go to the other stores looking for lower prices. If woman find something she likes very much but cannot afford it, she will try to cut a price or go there day after day waiting until particularly liked thing will be on sale. And she will get it anyway.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  On the contrary, men rarely go to other places looking for lower prices. Most of men will buy needed thing for indicated price. If man cannot afford to buy the thing he liked, he will wait until he collects necessary amount of money or more likely, forget about it next day.   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Shopping became unavoidable in our age of high technology. Thousands of men and women go to the Wal-Mart, Albertsons, or Sears everyday. However, I believe there is a different approach toward shopping which depends on person’s gender. I found that indeed most women enjoy doing shopping, while men shop just because they are out of necessary things.

Educational Philosophy :: Philosophy of Education Teaching Essays

Educational Philosophy For some, it is an occupation – a means of earning a living. For others, it is a skill performed with great ability and proficiency. What is it? It is teaching. Teaching, as defined by Webster’s New World Dictionary, is to â€Å"show or help (a person) to learn (how) to do something; to provide with knowledge, insight, etc.†(Webster’s, p. 605). Since the beginning of civilization, teaching has encompassed people’s lives. Building on the knowledge learned from his beloved teacher, Socrates, Plato created his own school to encourage others in their pursuit of knowledge. Even though the styles and philosophies of teaching have changed greatly since 2000B.C., the concept of an ideal teacher remains the same. Excellent educators inspire their students to reach for the stars. Our public education system in West Virginia is due to the valiant efforts of our forefathers. Fighting for a training arrangement applicable to ALL students, these pioneers provided the groundwork from which we have expounded. Our ancestors appreciated the importance of an adequate education, and now, it is our responsibility as present and future educators to continue the tradition. Providing equal and superb instruction to all students should be the number one priority for us teachers. Public educators have the greatest opportunity – to touch a child’s life for the better. As a public school teacher, I would set the expectations for my students at ceiling level, but then provide them with the ladder and walk them through each wrung to ensure accomplishment. I want to instill in my students that each child has the capacity for success (keeping in mind that each person has his own definition for success) and a lifelong thirst for knowledge. Children are like clothing. Some are â€Å"ironed† and â€Å"clean† from a childhood of love and true nurturing. Some are â€Å"wrinkled† and â€Å"worn† from a childhood of abuse and neglect. Some appear â€Å"irregular† as a result of a handicap or disability. Sadly, many are â€Å"labeled†, whether positively or negatively, before they complete their years in school.

Tuesday, October 1, 2019

Data Warehouse: Understanding Rei

John Smith Dr. Daniels 2/14/13 Chapter 5 Video Case 1. Data warehouses store current as well as historical data and are used for creating trending reports for senior management reporting such as annual and quarterly comparisons. REI is building a data warehouse because they want to better serve their customers with their products. The data ware house allows REI to make the customers experience with their company a much more fulfilling one ensuring their return. 2.Consumer cooperatives have some disadvantages in comparison to traditional firms. Consumer cooperatives require a high level of organization. Because the consumers are helping to make many decisions there are more legal responsibilities for the company. The company must listen to the consumers and also provide rules that the consumer cooperative must follow as a whole. While it is great for the consumers to be so involved, traditional firms have less of a hassle and don’t need to take so many extra steps when making d ecisions. . REI’s data warehouse will allow them to create more marketing strategies, specifically on their online shopping Website. With the use of the data warehouse, REI’s website will be able to recognize customers when they log on to the Website. By doing this, REI can tailor products or information to the customer each time they log on. 4. Some risks of creating a data warehouse would be organization.Without proper organization the company will not be able to achieve the strategic objectives set out by top management. This will make the company seem unprepared and ultimately give their customers an unpleasant experience. 5. REI chose to work with IBM data technology because IBM has very effective and organized systems that make managing the data warehouses simple and easy. This allows REI to make effective strategic objectives and marketing strategies for the company to follow and accomplish.

Monday, September 30, 2019

Bail Application Larceny

This matter is an application for conditional bail your honour. Mrs. Ayoub is a 51 year old divorced woman that lives on her own and has been charged with larceny under section 117, common assault under section 61 and resisting arrest, under section 58 of the Crimes Act 1900. Your honour, I submit my client has neither presumption in favour or against bail as she doesn’t fall under sections 8 to 9. Therefore Mrs. Ayoub has no presumption for bail however, under section 13 of the Bail Act, my client is still eligible for bail despite having no entitlement, therefore I plead for bail to be considered granted to my client.Has your honour been made aware of the facts of the case? * The alleged incident took place after a substantial amount of alcohol had been consumed, putting my client in a different state of mind. * It was not Mrs. Ayoub’s intention to steal the radio as she placed it in her shopping bag and was then distracted by a conversation. She then walked out of My er forgetting to pay for the radio which is when she was confronted by the security guard causing her to panic and push him away. * As a result of this, police arrived and Mrs. Ayoub was in a state of distress and the police struggled to escort her to the police vehicle till she calmed down.Your honour, the criteria to be considered in Mrs. Ayoub’s case regarding section 32 1) a) states â€Å"the probability of whether or not the person will appear in  court  in respect of the  offence  for which  bail  is being considered, having regard only to†: Subsection i. â€Å"the person’s background and community ties, as indicated by the history and details of the person’s residence,  employment  and family situations and the person’s prior criminal record† Your honour, my client was left by her husband many years ago and as a fifty one year old woman, resulted in psychological distress leading her to psychiatric help while he lives in America.She has no sureties or property as her only form of income is her pension cheque. She has no other immediate family in Sydney and resides at a unit in Parramatta but my client’s daughter keeps in contact with her mother and is willing to let Mrs. Ayoub reside with her in Melbourne. Due to this arrangement, my client will not breach such ties with her daughter by not appearing in court on set dates as it could strain the relationship with both parties. My client does have a criminal history over twenty years with ninety convictions of arceny, mainly shoplifting, however, none of the convictions consisted of assault or resisting arrest. Section 32 1) a) subsection ii. states â€Å"any previous failure to appear in  court  pursuant to a  bail undertaking  or pursuant to a recognizance of  bail  entered into before the commencement of this section† Your honour, my client has never failed to appear in court even though she has a medical certificate fr om her previous psychiatrist stating that she had a nervous breakdown when her husband left her.Section 32 1) a) subsection ii. reads â€Å"the circumstances of the  offence  (including its nature and seriousness), the strength of the evidence against the person and the severity of the penalty or probable penalty† Your honour, my client’s offence of assault and resisting arrest were as a result of the alleged larceny as she had no intention to steal the radio, there is no evidence to prove that my client’s intention was to permanently deprive the owner of that property.The mental element of committing the crime is not present as my client was in severe distress when she had forgotten that it was still in her bag. Mrs. Ayoub was taken by surprise when the guard approached her and didn’t intend any harm towards him when she pushed him away as she panicked. When the police arrived, she struggled as they escorted her but didn’t try to resist, preve nt or oppose her arrest as she only just struggled till they calmed her down.Under these circumstances, my client was misunderstood as she was in a different state of mind and doesn’t deserve the severity of these punishments including larceny under section 117 carrying a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment, common assault under section 61 carrying a maximum of sentence of two years imprisonment and resisting arrest, under section 58 carrying a maximum sentence of five years imprisonment.Section 32 1) b) reads the interest of the person having regard only to: Subsection iv) â€Å"whether or not the person is, in the opinion of the  authorised officer  or  court, incapacitated by intoxication, injury or use of a drug or is otherwise in danger of physical injury or in need of physical protection† Your honour, my client has an ongoing problem with alcohol leading to intoxication which may lead to making unsound judgements/decisions and for this reason may ne ed professional help or counselling regarding her alcohol problem as her addiction may get worse if it is not treated properly.Section 32 1) b1) subsection i) states the protection of â€Å"any person against whom it is alleged that the offence concerned was committed† In regards to the protection of the security guard, my client has no intention to harm him or any intention to revisit that store as she is willing to move to Melbourne to live with her daughter.Section 32 1) c) subsection iv) reads â€Å"the protection and welfare of the community, having regard only to whether or not it is likely that the person will commit any serious  offence  while at liberty on  bail, but the  authorised officer  or  court  may have regard to this likelihood† Your honour, my client’s history of larceny may be an issue but to stop my client from reoffending, her daughter is willing to let my client live with her which will influence her to the good as she wonâ⠂¬â„¢t put strain on the relationship she has with her only family.As this is an application for conditional bail, under bail conditions section 36 2) a) one or more of the following conditions only may be imposed on the grant of  bail; that the accused person  enter  into an agreement to observe specified requirements as to his or her conduct while at liberty on  bail, other than financial requirements. Your honour, my client is willing to enter an agreement concerning residing at a specific premises and entering a rehabilitation program for her alcohol abuse which will prevent my client from panicking in certain situations causing her to cause harm to others.Section 36 2) a1) states  that the accused person enter into an agreement to reside, while at liberty on  bail, in accommodation for persons on  bail. As mentioned before, my client has agreed to reside with her daughter at 12 Brown Road, Brownfield 3425 in Melbourne. Living with her daughter will influence my cl ient to obey the laws and prevent her from shoplifting which may have a positive impact on her life. This way, Mrs.Ayoub’s pension cheque won’t be her only form of income as her daughter will provide for my client which will minimize the chances of my client wanting to shoplift. My client agrees to appear in court when needed and will sign in at an assigned police station if granted bail. Section 36 2) b) states â€Å"that one or  more than one  acceptable person (other than the accused person) acknowledge that he or she is acquainted with the accused person and that he or she regards the accused person as a responsible person who is likely to comply with his or her  bail undertaking. Your honour my client’s daughter has acknowledged her mother as a responsible person as she wouldn’t be willing to let her stay if she wasn’t likely to comply with her bail conditions. To conclude my submissions, I would like your honour to take into considerat ion the misunderstanding of the three offences as my client expresses great remorse and is embarrassed that her intoxication led to this stage. If your honour has no further questions, that concludes my submission.

Sunday, September 29, 2019

The Theory of Financial Intermediation:

THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION: AN ESSAY ON WHAT IT DOES (NOT) EXPLAIN by Bert Scholtens and Dick van Wensveen SUERF – The European Money and Finance Forum Vienna 2003 CIP The Theory of Financial Intermediation: An Essay On What It Does (Not) Explain by Bert Scholtens, and Dick van Wensveen Vienna: SUERF (SUERF Studies: 2003/1) ISBN 3-902109-15-7 Keywords: Financial Intermediation, Corporate Finance, Assymetric Information, Economic Development, Risk Management, Value Creation, Risk Transformation. JELclassificationnumbers: E50,G10,G20,L20,O16  © 2003 SUERF, ViennaCopyright reserved. Subject to the exception provided for by law, no part of this publication may be reproduced and/or published in print, by photocopying, on microfilm or in any other way without the written consent of the copyright holder(s); the same applies to whole or partial adaptations. The publisher retains the sole right to collect from third parties fees payable in respect of copying and/or take l egal or other action for this purpose. THE THEORY OF FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AN ESSAY ON WHAT IT DOES (NOT) EXPLAIN+ by Bert Scholtens* Dick van Wensveen†  Also read: Theories Seen in OjtAbstract This essay reflects upon the relationship between the current theory of financial intermediation and real-world practice. Our critical analysis of this theory leads to several building blocks of a new theory of financial intermediation. Current financial intermediation theory builds on the notion that intermediaries serve to reduce transaction costs and informational asymmetries. As developments in information technology, deregulation, deepening of financial markets, etc. end to reduce transaction costs and informational asymmetries, financial intermediation theory shall come to the conclusion that intermediation becomes useless. This contrasts with the practitioner’s view of financial intermediation as a value-creating economic process. It also conflicts with the continuing and increasing economic importance of financial intermediaries. From this paradox, we conclude that current financial intermediation theory fails to provide a satisf actory understanding of the existence of financial intermediaries. We wish to thank Arnoud Boot, David T. Llewellyn, Martin M. G. Fase and Robert Merton for their help and their stimulating comments. However, all opinions reflect those of the authors and only we are responsible for mistakes and omissions. * Associate Professor of Financial Economics at the University of Groningen; PO Box 800; 9700AVGroningen;TheNetherlands(correspondingauthor). †  Professor of Financial Institutions at the Erasmus University of Rotterdam; PO Box 1738; 3000 DR Rotterdam; The Netherlands, (former Chairman of the Managing Board of MeesPierson).We present building blocks for a theory of financial intermediation that aims at understanding and explaining the existence and the behavior of real-life financial intermediaries. When information asymmetries are not the driving force behind intermediation activity and their elimination is not the commercial motive for financial intermediaries, the question arises which paradigm, as an alternative, could better express the essence of the intermediation process. In our opinion, the concept of value creation in the context of the value chain might serve that purpose.And, in our opinion, it is risk and risk management that drives this value creation. The absorption of risk is the central function of both banking and insurance. The risk function bridges a mismatch between the supply of savings and the demand for investments as savers are on average more risk averse than real investors. Risk, that means maturity risk, counterparty risk, market risk (interest rate and stock prices), life expectancy, income expectancy risk etc. , is the core business of the financial industry.Financial intermediaries can absorb risk on the scale required by the market because their scale permits a sufficiently diversified portfolio of investments needed to offer the security required by savers and policyholders. Financial intermediaries are not just agents wh o screen and monitor on behalf of savers. They are active counterparts themselves offering a specific product that cannot be offered by individual investors to savers, namely cover for risk. They use their reputation and their balance sheet and off-balance sheet items, rather than their very limited own funds, to act as such counterparts.As such, they have a crucial function within the modern economy. TABLE OF CONTENTS 1. Introduction7 2. The Perfect Model9 3. Financial Intermediaries in the Economy11 4. Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation15 5. Critical Assessment21 6. An Alternative Approach of Financial Intermediation31 7. Building Blocks for an Amended Theory37 8. A New Research Agenda41 References45 Appendix A53 Tables 1. Share of Employment in Financial Services in Total Employment (percentages)12 2. Share of Value-Added in Financial Services in GDP (percentages)12 3.Financial Intermediary Development over Time for About 150 Countries (percentages)12 4. (Stylized) Conte mporary and Amended Theory of Financial Intermediation38 SUERF56 SUERF Studies57 1. Introduction When a banker starts to study the theory of financial intermediation in order to better understand what he has done during his professional life, he enters a world unknown to him. That world is full of concepts which he did not, or hardly, knew before and full of expressions he never used himself: asymmetric information, adverse selection, monitoring, costly state verification, moral hazard and a couple more of the same kind.He gets the uneasy feeling that a growing divergence has emerged between the micro- economic theory of banking, as it took shape in the last three decades, and the everyday behavior of bankers according to their business motives, expressed in the language they use. This essay tries to reflect on the merits of the present theory of financial intermediation, on what it does and does not explain from both a practical and a theoretical point of view. The theory is impres sive by the multitude of applications in the financial world of the agency theory and the theory of asymmetric information, of adverse selection and moral hazard.As well as by their relevance for important aspects of the financial intermediation process, as is shown in an ever-growing stream of economic studies. But the study of all these theories leaves the practitioner with the impression that they do not provide a satisfactory answer to the basic question; which forces really drive the financial intermediation process? The current theory shows and explains a great variety in the behavior of financial intermediaries in the market in their relation to savers and to investors/entrepreneurs.But as far as the authors of this essay are aware, it does not, or not yet, provide a satisfactory answer to the question of why real-life financial institutions exist, what keeps them alive and what is their essential contribution to (inter)national economic welfare. We believe that this question cannot be addressed by a further extension of the present theory, by the framework of the agency theory and the theory of asymmetric information. The question goes into the heart of the present theory, into the paradigm on which it is based.This paradigm is the famous classical idea of the perfect market, introduced by Marshall and Walras. Since then, it has been the leading principle, the central point of reference in the theory of competition, the neoclassical growth theory, the portfolio theory and also the leading principle of the present theory of financial intermediation. Financial intermediaries, according to that theory, have a function only because financial markets are not perfect. They exist by the grace of market 7 8Introduction imperfections.As long as there are market imperfections, there are intermediaries. As soon as markets are perfect, intermediaries are redundant; they have lost their function because savers and investors dispose of the perfect information needed to find each other directly, immediately and without any impediments, so without costs, and to deal at optimal prices. This is the general equilibrium model a la Arrow-Debreu in which banks cannot exist. Obviously, this contrasts with the huge economic and social importance of financial intermediaries in highly developed modern economies.Empirical observations point at an increasing role for financial intermediaries in economies that experience vastly decreasing information and transaction costs. Our essay goes into this paradox and comes up with an amendment of the existing theory of financial intermediation. The structure of this paper is as follows. First, we introduce the foundations of the modern literature of financial intermediation theory. From this, we infer the key predictions with respect to the role of the financial intermediary within the economy.In Section 3, we will investigate the de facto role of financial intermediaries in modern economies. We discuss views on the theoretical relevance of financial intermediaries for economic growth. We also present some stylized facts and empirical observations about their current position in the economy. The mainstream theory of financial intermediation is briefly presented in Section 4. Of course, we cannot pay sufficient attention to all developments in this area but will focus on the basic rationales for financial intermediaries according to this theory, i. . information problems, transaction costs, and regulation. Section 5 is a critical assessment of this theory of financial intermediation. An alternative approach of financial intermediation is unfolded in Section 6. In Section 7, we present the main building blocks for an alternative theory of financial intermediation that aims at understanding and explaining the behavior of real-life financial intermediaries. Here, we argue that risk management is the core issue in understanding this behavior.Transforming risk for ultimate savers and lenders and ris k management by the financial intermediary itself creates economic value, both for the intermediary and for its client. Accordingly, it is the transformation and management of risk that is the intermediaries’ contribution to the economic welfare of the society it operates in. This is – in our opinion – the hidden or neglected economic rationale behind the emergence and the existence and the future of real-life financial intermediaries.In Section 8, we conclude our essay with a proposal for a research agenda for an amended theory of financial intermediation. 2. The Perfect Model Three pillars are at the basis of the modern theory of finance: optimality, arbitrage, and equilibrium. Optimality refers to the notion that rational investors aim at optimal returns. Arbitrage implies that the same asset has the same price in each single period in the absence of restrictions. Equilibrium means that markets are cleared by price adjustment – through arbitrage â€⠀œ at each moment in time.In the neoclassical model of a perfect market, e. g. the perfect market for capital, or the Arrow-Debreu world, the following criteria usually must be met: –no individual party on the market can influence prices; – conditions for borrowing/lending are equal for all parties under equal circumstances; –there are no discriminatory taxes; –absence of scale and scope economies; –all financial titles are homogeneous, divisible and tradable; – there are no information costs, no transaction costs and no insolvency costs; –all market parties have ex ante nd ex post immediate and full information on all factors and events relevant for the (future) value of the traded financial instruments. The Arrow-Debreu world is based on the paradigm of complete markets. In the case of complete markets, present value prices of investment projects are well defined. Savers and investors find each other because they have perfect inform ation on each others preferences at no cost in order to exchange savings against readily available financial instruments.These instruments are constructed and traded costlessly and they fully and simultaneously meet the needs of both savers and investors. Thus, each possible future state of the world is fully covered by a so-called Arrow-Debreu security (state contingent claim). Also important is that the supply of capital instruments is sufficiently diversified as to provide the possibility of full risk diversification and, thanks to complete information, market parties have homogenous expectations and act rationally.In so far as this does not occur naturally, intermediaries are useful to bring savers and investors together and to create instruments that meet their needs. They do so with reimbursement of costs, but costs are by definition an element – or, rather, characteristic – of market imperfection. Therefore, intermediaries are at best tolerated and would be elim inated in a move towards market perfection, with all intermediaries becoming 9 10The Perfect Model redundant: the perfect state of disintermediation. This model is the starting point in the present theory of financial intermediation.All deviations from this model which exist in the real world and which cause intermediation by the specialized financial intermediaries, are seen as market imperfections. This wording suggests that intermediation is something which exploits a situation which is not perfect, therefore is undesirable and should or will be temporary. The perfect market is like heaven, it is a teleological perspective, an ideal standard according to which reality is judged. As soon as we are in heaven, intermediaries are superfluous. There is no room for them in that magnificent place.Are we going to heaven? Are intermediaries increasingly becoming superfluous? One would be inclined to answer both questions in the affirmative when looking to what is actually happening: Incre asingly, we have to make do with liberalized, deregulated financial markets. All information on important macroeconomic and monetary data and on the quality and activities of market participants is available in ‘real time’, on a global scale, twenty-four hours a day, thanks to the breathtaking developments in information and communication technology.Firms issue shares over the Internet and investors can put their order directly in financial markets thanks to the virtual reality. The communication revolution also reduces information costs tremendously. The liberalization and deregulation give, moreover, a strong stimulus towards the securitization of financial instruments, making them transparent, homogeneous, and tradable in the international financial centers in the world. Only taxes are discriminating, inside and between countries. Transaction costs are still there, but they are declining in relative importance thanks to the cost efficiency of ICT and efficiencies of scale.Insolvency and liquidity risks, however, still are an important source of heterogeneity of financial titles. Furthermore, every new crash or crisis invokes calls for additional and more timely information. For example, the Asia crisis resulted in more advanced and verifiable and controllable international financial statistics, whereas the Enron debacle has put the existing business accounting and reporting standards into question. There appears to be an almost unstoppable demand for additional information. 3. Financial Intermediaries in the EconomySo, we are making important progress in our march towards heaven and what happens? Is financial intermediation fading away? One might think so from the forces shaping the current financial environment: deregulation and liberalization, communication, internationalization. But what is actually happening in the real world? Do we really witness the demise of the financial institutions? Are the intermediaries about to vanish from planet E arth? On the contrary, their economic importance is higher than ever and appears to be increasing.This is the case even during the 1990s when markets became almost fully liberalized and when communication on a global scale made a real and almost complete breakthrough. The tendency towards an increasing role of financial intermediation is illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 that give the relative contribution of the financial sector to the two key items of economic wealth and welfare in most nations, i. e. GDP and labor. These tables show that, even in highly developed markets, financial intermediaries tend to play a substantial and increasing role in the current economy.Furthermore, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999) among others, conclude that claims of deposit money banks and of other financial institutions on the private sector have steadily increased as a percentage of GDP in a large number of countries (circa 150), rich and poor, between the 1960s and 1990s. The pace of increase is not declining in the 1990s. This is reflected in Table 3. In the 1960s, Raymond Goldsmith (1969) gave stylized facts on financial structure and economic development (see appendix A). He found that in the course of economic development, a country’s financial system grows more rapidly than national wealth.It appears that the main determinant of the relative size of a country’s financial system is the separation of the functions of saving and investing among different (groups of) economic units. This observation sounds remarkably modern. Since the early 1990s, there has been growing recognition for the positive impact of financial intermediation on the economy. Both theoretical and empirical studies find that a well-developed financial system is beneficial to the economy as a whole. Basically the argument behind this idea is that the efficient allocation of capital within an economy fosters economic growth (see Levine, 1997).Financial intermediation can affect economic growth by acting on the saving rate, on the fraction of saving channeled to investment or on the social marginal productivity of investment. In general, financial development will be positive for economic growth. But some improvements in risk-sharing and in the 11 12Financial Intermediaries in the Economy credit market for households may decrease the saving rate and, hence, the growth rate (Pagano, 1993). Table 1: Share of Employment in Financial Services in Total Employment (percentages) Source: OECD, National Accounts (various issues)Table 2: Share of Value-Added in Financial Services in GDP (percentages) Source: OECD, National Accounts (various issues) Table 3: Financial Intermediary Development over Time for About 150 Countries (percentages) Source: Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999, Figure 2A) 1970 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Canada 2. 4 2. 7 2. 9 3. 0 3. 2 3. 1 France 1. 8 2. 6 2. 9 2. 8 2. 7 2. 8 Germany 2. 2 2. 8 3. 0 3. 1 3. 3 3. 3 Japan 2. 4 3. 0 3. 2 3. 3 3. 4 3. 5 Switzerland â€⠀œ – 4. 6 4. 8 4. 8 4. 9 United Kingdom – 3. 0 3. 5 4. 6 4. 4 4. 4 United States 3. 8 4. 4 4. 7 4. 8 4. 8 4. 8 1970 980 1985 1990 1995 2000 Canada 2. 2 1. 8 2. 0 2. 8 2. 9 3. 1 France 3. 5 4. 4 4. 8 4. 4 4. 6 4. 8 Germany 3. 2 4. 5 5. 5 4. 8 5. 8 5. 7 Japan 4. 3 4. 5 5. 5 4. 8 5. 6 5. 3 Netherlands 3. 1 4. 0 5. 3 5. 6 5. 5 5. 8 Switzerland – – 10. 4 10. 3 13. 1 12. 8 United States 4. 0 4. 8 5. 5 6. 1 7. 2 7. 1 1960s 1970s 1980s 1990s Liquid liabilities/GDP 32 39 47 51 Claims by deposit money banks on private sector/GDP 20 24 32 39 Financial Intermediaries in the Economy13 There are different views on how the financial structure affects economic growth exactly (Levine, 2000). The bank-based view holds that bank-based systems – particularly at early stages of economic development – foster economic growth to a greater degree than market-based systems. ? The market-based view emphasizes that markets provide key financial services that stimulate innovation and long-run growth. ? The financial services view stresses the role of banks and markets in researching firms, exerting corporate control, creating risk management devices, and mobilizing society’s savings for the most productive endeavors in tandem.As such, it does regard banks and markets as complements rather than substitutes as it focuses on the quality of the financial services produced by the entire financial system. ? The legal-based view rejects the analytical validity of the financial structure debate. It argues that the legal system shapes the quality of financial services (for example La Porta et al. , 1998). The legal-based view stresses that the component of financial development explained by the legal system critically influences long-run growth.Political factors have been introduced too, in order to explain the relationship between financial and economic development (see Fohlin, 2000; Kroszner and Strahan, 2000; Rajan and Zingales, 2000). From empir ical research of the relationship between economic and financial development, it appears that history and path-dependency weigh very heavy in determining the growth and design of financial institutions and markets. Furthermore, idiosyncratic shocks that surprise institutions and markets over time appear to be quite important.Despite obvious connections among political, legal, economic, and financial institutions and markets, long-term causal relationships often prove to be elusive and appear to depend upon the methodology chosen to study the relationship. 1 But it is important to realize that efficient financial intermediation confers two important benefits: it raises 1 For example, see Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Sala-i-Martin, 1997; Fazzari et al. , 1988; Levine and Zervos, 1998; Demirguc-Kunt and Levine, 1999; Filer et al, 1999; Beck and Levine, 2000; Beck et al. 2000; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Demirguc-Kunt and Mak simovic, 2000; Rousseau and Wachtel, 2000; Arestis et al. , 2001; Wachtel, 2001. 14Financial Intermediaries in the Economy the level of investment and savings, and it increases the efficiency in the allocation of financial funds in the economic system. There is a structural tendency in the composition of national wealth represented in financial titles in many countries, especially the Anglo Saxon, towards the substitution of bank held assets (bank loans etc. ) by securitized assets held by the public (equity, bonds) (Ross, 1989).This substitution is often interpreted as a proof of the disintermediation process (e. g. Allen and Santomero, 1997). However, this substitution does not imply that bank loans are not growing any more. To the contrary, they continue to grow, even in the U. S. where the substitution is most visible (see Boyd and Gertler, 1994; Berger et al. , 1995). Therefore, this substitution may not be interpreted as a sign of a diminishing role of banking in general. This is because it is the banks that play an essential role in the securitized instruments.They initiate, arrange and underwrite the floating of these instruments. They often maintain a secondary market. They invent a multitude of off-balance instruments derived from securities. They provide for the clearing of the deals. They are the custodians of these constructions. They provide stock lending and they finance market makers in options and futures. Thus, banks are crucial drivers of financial innovation. Furthermore, it is still an unsolved question of how the off-balance instruments should be counted in the statistics of national wealth.Their huge notional amounts do not reflect the constantly varying values for the contracting parties. Banks are moving in an off-balance direction and their purpose is increasingly to develop and provide tradable and non-tradable risk management instruments. And other kinds of financial intermediaries play an increasingly important role in the same dir ection, both in securitized and non-tradable instruments, both on- and off-balance: insurance companies, pension funds, investments funds, market makers at stock exchanges and derivative markets.These different kinds of financial intermediaries transform risk (concerning future income or accidents or interest rate fluctuations or stock price fluctuations, etc. ). Risk transformation and risk management is their job. Thus, despite the globalization of financial services, driven by deregulation and information technology ,and despite strong price competition, the financial services industry is not declining in importance but it is growing. This seems paradoxical. It points to something important which the modern financial intermediation theory, and the neo-classical market theory on which it is based, do not explain.Might it be the case that it overlooks something crucial? Something that is to be related to information production but that is, so far, not uncovered by the theory of fin ancial intermediation? 4. Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation In order to give firm ground to our argument and to illustrate the paradox, we will first review the doctrines of the theory of financial intermediation. 2 These are specifications, relevant to the financial services industry, of the agency theory, and the theory of imperfect or asymmetric information.Basically, we may distinguish between three lines of reasoning that aim at explaining the raison d’etre of financial intermediaries: information problems, transaction costs and regulatory factors. First, and that used in most studies on financial intermediation, is the informational asymmetries argument. These asymmetries can be of an ex ante nature, generating adverse selection, they can be interim, generating moral hazard, and they can be of an ex post nature, resulting in auditing or costly state verification and enforcement. The informational asymmetries generate market imperfections, i. . deviations from the neoclassical framework in Section 2. Many of these imperfections lead to specific forms of transaction costs. Financial intermediaries appear to overcome these costs, at least partially. For example, Diamond and Dybvig (1983) consider banks as coalitions of depositors that provide households with insurance against idiosyncratic shocks that adversely affect their liquidity position. Another approach is based on Leland and Pyle (1977). They interpret financial intermediaries as information sharing coalitions.Diamond (1984) shows that these intermediary coalitions can achieve economies of scale. Diamond (1984) is also of the view that financial intermediaries act as delegated monitors on behalf of ultimate savers. Monitoring will involve increasing returns to scale, which implies that specializing may be attractive. Individual households will delegate the monitoring activity to such a specialist, i. e. to the financial intermediary. The households will put their deposits with the i ntermediary. They may withdraw the deposits in order to discipline the intermediary in his monitoring function.Furthermore, they will positively value the intermediary’s involvement in the ultimate investment (Hart, 1995). Also, there can be assigned a positive incentive effect of short-term debt, and in particular deposits, on bankers (Hart and Moore, 1995). For example, Qi (1998) and Diamond and Rajan (2001) show that deposit finance can create 2 We have used the widely cited reviews by Allen, 1991; Bhattacharya and Thakor, 1993; Van Damme, 1994; Freixas and Rochet 1997; Allen and Gale, 2000b; Gorton and Winton, 2002, as our main sources in this section. 15 6Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation the right incentives for a bank’s management. Illiquid assets of the bank result in a fragile financial structure that is essential for disciplining the bank manager. Note that in the case households that do not turn to intermediated finance but prefer direct finance, t here is still a â€Å"brokerage† role for financial intermediaries, such as investment banks (see Baron, 1979 and 1982). Here, the reputation effect is also at stake. In financing, both the reputation of the borrower and that of the financier are relevant (Hart and Moore, 1998).Dinc (2001) studies the effects of financial market competition on a bank reputation mechanism, and argues that the incentive for the bank to keep its commitment is derived from its reputation, the number of competing banks and their reputation, and the competition from bond markets. These four aspects clearly interact (see also Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor, 1993). The â€Å"informational asymmetry† studies focus on the bank/borrower and the bank/lender relation in particular. In bank lending one can basically distinguish transactions-based lending (financial statement lending, asset- based lending, credit scoring, etc. ) and relationship lending.In the former class information that is relatively easily available at the time of loan origination is used. In the latter class, data gathered over the course of the relationship with the borrower is used (see Lehman and Neuberger, 2001; Kroszner and Strahan, 2001; Berger and Udell, 2002). Central themes in the bank/borrower relation are the screening and monitoring function of banks (ex ante information asymmetries), the adverse selection problem (Akerlof, 1970), credit rationing (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), the moral hazard problem (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1983) and the ex post verification problem (Gale and Hellwig, 1985).Central themes in the bank/lender relation are bank runs, why they occur, how they can be prevented, and their economic consequences (Kindleberger, 1989; Bernanke, 1983; Diamond and Dybvig, 1983). Another avenue in the bank/lender relationship are models for competition between banks for deposits in relation to their lending policy and the probability that they fulfill their obligations (Boot, 2000; Diamond and Raja n, 2001). Second is the transaction costs approach (examples are Benston and Smith, 1976; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980; Fama, 1980).In contrast to the first, this approach does not contradict the assumption of complete markets. It is based on nonconvexities in transaction technologies. Here, the financial intermediaries act as coalitions of individual lenders or borrowers who exploit economies of scale or scope in the transaction technology. The notion of transaction costs encompasses not only exchange or monetary transaction costs (see Tobin, 1963; Towey, 1974; Fischer, 1983), but also search costs and monitoring and auditing costs (Benston and Smith, 1976). Here, the role of Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation17 he financial intermediaries is to transform particular financial claims into other types of claims (so-called qualitative asset transformation). As such, they offer liquidity (Pyle, 1971) and diversification opportunities (Hellwig, 1991). The provision of liquidity is a key function for savers and investors and increasingly for corporate customers, whereas the provision of diversification increasingly is being appreciated in personal and institutional financing. Holmstrom and Tirole (2001) suggest that this liquidity should play a key role in asset pricing theory.The result is that unique characteristics of bank loans emerge to enhance efficiency between borrower and lender. In loan contract design, it is the urge to be able to efficiently bargain in later (re)negotiations, rather than to fully assess current or expected default risk that structures the ultimate contract (Gorton and Kahn, 2000). With transaction costs, and in contrast to the information asymmetry approach, the reason for the existence of financial intermediaries, namely transaction costs, is exogenous. This is not fully the case in the third approach.The third approach to explain the raison d’etre of financial intermediaries is based on the regulation of money production and of saving in and financing of the economy (see Guttentag and Lindsay, 1968; Fama, 1980; Mankiw, 1986; Merton, 1995b). Regulation affects solvency and liquidity with the financial institution. Diamond and Rajan (2000) show that bank capital affects bank safety, the bank’s ability to refinance, and the bank’s ability to extract repayment from borrowers or its willingness to liquidate them.The legal-based view especially (see Section 3), sees regulation as a crucial factor that shapes the financial economy (La Porta et al. , 1998). Many view financial regulations as something that is completely exogenous to the financial industry. However, the activities of the intermediaries inherently â€Å"ask for regulation†. This is because they, the banks in particular, by the way and the art of their activities (i. e. qualitative asset transformation), are inherently insolvent and illiquid (for the example of deposit insurance, see Merton and Bodie, 1993).Furthermore, mo ney and its value, the key raw material of the financial services industry, to a large extent is both defined and determined by the nation state, i. e. by regulating authorities par excellence. Safety and soundness of the financial system as a whole and the enactment of industrial, financial, and fiscal policies are regarded as the main reasons to regulate the financial industry (see Kareken, 1986; Goodhart, 1987; Boot and Thakor, 1993).Also, the financial history shows a clear interplay between financial institutions and markets and the regulators, be it the present-day specialized financial supervisors or the old-fashioned sovereigns (Kindleberger, 1993). Regulation of financial intermediaries, especially of banks, is costly. There are the direct costs of administration and of employing the supervisors, and 18Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation there are the indirect costs of the distortions generated by monetary and prudential supervision.Regulation however, may also gene rate rents for the regulated financial intermediaries, since it may hamper market entry as well as exit. So, there is a true dynamic relationship between regulation and financial production. It must be noted that, once again, most of the literature in this category focuses on explaining the functioning of the financial intermediary with regulation as an exogenous force. Kane (1977) and Fohlin (2000) attempt to develop theories that explain the existence of the very extensive regulation of financial intermediaries when they go into the dynamics of financial regulation. Thus, to summarize, according to the modern theory of financial intermediation, financial intermediaries are active because market imperfections prevent savers and investors from trading directly with each other in an optimal way. The most important market imperfections are the informational asymmetries between savers and investors. Financial intermediaries, banks specifically, fill – as agents and as delegated monitors – information gaps between ultimate savers and investors. This is because they have a comparative informational advantage over ultimate savers and investors.They screen and monitor investors on behalf of savers. This is their basic function, which justifies the transaction costs they charge to parties. They also bridge the maturity mismatch between savers and investors and facilitate payments between economic parties by providing a payment, settlement and clearing system. Consequently, they engage in qualitative asset transformation activities. To ensure the sustainability of financial intermediation, safety and soundness regulation has to be put in place. Regulation also provides the basis for the intermediaries to enact in the production of their monetary services.All studies on the reasons behind financial intermediation focus on the functioning of intermediaries in the intermediation process; they do not examine the existence of the real-world intermediaries as s uch. It appears that the latter issue is regarded to be dealt with when satisfactory answers on the former are being provided. Market optimization is the main point of reference 3 The importance of regulation for the existence of the financial intermediary can best be understood if one is prepared to account for the historical and institutional setting of financial intermediation (see Kindleberger, 1993; Merton, 1995b).Interestingly, and illustrating the crucial importance of regulation for financial intermediation, is that there are some authors who suggest that unregulated finance or ‘free banking’ would be highly desirable, as it would be stable and inflation-free. Proponents of this view are, among others, White, 1984; Selgin, 1987; Dowd, 1989. Modern Theories of Financial Intermediation19 in case of the functioning of the intermediaries. The studies that appear in most academic journals analyze situations and conditions under which banks or other intermediaries are making markets less imperfect as well as the impediments to their optimal functioning.Perfect markets are the benchmarks and the intermediating parties are analyzed and judged from the viewpoint of their contribution to an optimal allocation of savings, that means to market perfection. Ideally, financial intermediaries should not be there and, being there, they at best alleviate market imperfections as long as the real market parties have no perfect information. On the other hand, they maintain market imperfections as long as they do not completely eliminate informational asymmetries, and even increase market imperfections when their risk aversion creates credit crunches.So, there appears not to be a heroic role for intermediaries at all! But if this is really true, why are these weird creatures still in business, even despite the fierce competition amongst themselves? Are they truly dinosaurs, completely unaware of the extinction they will face in the very near future? This seems highly unlikely. Section 3 showed and argued that the financial intermediaries are alive and kicking. They have a crucial and even increasing role within the real-world economy. They increasingly are linked up in all kinds of economic transactions and processes.Therefore, the next section is a critical assessment of the modern theory of financial intermediation in the face of the real-world behavior and impact of financial institutions and markets. 5. Critical Assessment Two issues are of key importance. The first is about why we demand banks and other kinds of financial intermediaries. The answer to this question, in our opinion, is risk management rather than informational asymmetries or transaction costs. Economies of scale and scope as well as the delegation of the screening and monitoring function especially apply to dealing with risk itself, rather than only with information.The second issue that matters is why banks and other financial institutions are willing and able to tak e on the risks that are inevitably involved in their activity. In this respect, it is important to note that financial intermediaries are able to create comparative advantages with respect to information acquisition and processing in relation to their sheer size in relation to the customer whereby they are able to manage risk more efficiently. We suggest Schumpeter’s view of entrepreneurs as innovators and Merton’s functional perspective of financial intermediaries in tandem are very helpful in this respect.One should question whether the existence of financial intermediaries and the structural development of financial intermediation can be fully explained by a theoretical framework based on the neo-classical concept of perfect competition. The mainstream theory of financial intermediation, as it has been developed in the past few decades, has – without any doubt – provided numerous valuable insights into the behavior of banks and other intermediaries and their managers in the financial markets under a broad variety of perceived and observed circumstances.For example, the â€Å"agency revolution†, unleashed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), focussed on principal-agent relation asymmetries. Contracts and conflicts of interest on all levels inside and outside the firm in a world full of information asymmetries became the central theme in the analysis of financial decisions. Important aspects of financial decisions, which previously went unnoticed in the neo- classical theory, could be studied in this approach, and a â€Å"black box† of financial decision making was opened. But the power of the agency heory is also her weakness: it mainly explains ad hoc situations; new models based on different combinations of assumptions continuously extend it. 4 In nearly all 4 To this extent, one can draw a striking parallel with the traditional Newtonian view of the natural world. The planetary orbits round the Sun can be explained very well with the Newtonian laws of gravitation and force. Apparent anomalies in the orbital movement of Neptune turned out to be caused by the influence of an hitherto unknown planet (Pluto).Its (predicted) astronomical 21 22Critical Assessment financial decisions, information differences and, as a consequence, conflicts of interest, play a role. Focussed on these aspects, the agency theory is capable of investigating nearly every contingency in the interaction of economic agents deviating from what they would have done in a market with perfect foresight and equal incentives for all agents. However, the applications from agency theory have mainly anecdotal value; they are tested in a multitude of specific cases.But the theory fails to evolve into a general and coherent explanation of what is the basic function of financial intermediaries in the markets and the economy as a whole. Various researchers interested in real world financial phenomena have pointed out that banks in particular do make a difference. They come up with empirical evidence that banks are special. For example, Fama (1985) and James (1987) analyze the incidence of the implicit tax due to reserve requirements. Both conclude that bank loans are special, as bank CDs have not been eliminated by non-bank alternatives that bear no reserve requirements.Mikkelson and Partch (1986) and James (1987) look at the abnormal returns associated with announcements of different types of security offerings and find a positive response to bank loans. Lummer and McConnel (1989) and Best and Zhang (1993) have confirmed these results. Slovin et al. (1993) look into the adverse effect on the borrower in case a borrower’s bank fails. They find Continental Illinois borrowers incur significant negative abnormal returns during the bank’s impending failure. Gibson (1995) finds similar results when studying the effects of the health of Japanese banks on borrowers.Gilson et al. (1990) find that the likelihood o f a successful debt restructuring by a firm in distress is positively related to the extent of that firm’s reliance on bank borrowing. James (1996) finds that the higher the proportion of total debt held by the bank, the higher the likelihood the bank debt will be impaired, and so the higher the likelihood that it participates in the restructuring. Hoshi et al. (1991) for Japan and Fohlin (1998) and Gorton and Schmid (1999) for Germany also find that in these countries, banks provide valuable services that cannot be replicated in capital markets.Current intermediation theory treats such observations often as an anomaly. But, in our perspective, it relates rather to the insufficient explanatory power of the current theory of financial intermediation. observation was regarded as an even greater victory for Newtonian theory. However, it took Einstein and Bohr to reveal that this theory is only a limit case as it is completely unable to deal with the behavior of microparticles (s ee Couper and Henbest, 1985; Ferris, 1988; Hawking, 1988). Critical Assessment23The basic reason for the insufficient explanatory power of the present intermediation theory has, in our opinion, to be sought in the paradigm of asymmetrical information. Markets are imperfect, according to this paradigm, because the ultimate parties who operate in the markets have insufficient information to conclude a transaction by themselves. Financial intermediaries position themselves as agents (â€Å"middlemen†) between savers and investors, alleviating information asymmetries against transaction costs to a level where total savings are absorbed by real investments at equilibrium real interest rates.But in the real world, financial intermediaries do not consider themselves agents who intermediate between savers and investors by procuring information on investors to savers and by selecting and monitoring investors on behalf of savers. That is not their job. They deal in money and in risk, n ot in information per se. Information production predominantly is a means to the end of risk management. In the real world, borrowers, lenders, savers, investors and financial supervisors look at them in the same way, i. . risk managers instead of information producers. Financial intermediaries deal in financial services, created by themselves, mostly for their own account, via their balance sheet, so for their own risk. They attract savings from the saver and lend it to the investor, adding value by meeting the specific needs of savers and investors at prices that equilibrate the supply and demand of money. This is a creative process, which cannot be characterized by the reduction of information asymmetries.In the intermediation process the financial intermediary transforms savings, given the preferences of the saver with respect to liquidity and risk, into investments according to the needs and the risk profile of the investor. It might be clear that for these reasons the views of Bryant (1980) and of Diamond and Dybvig (1983) on the bank as a coalition of depositors, of Akerlof (1970) and Leland and Pyle (1977) on the bank as an information sharing coalition, and of Diamond (1984) on the bank as delegated (†¦ monitor, do not reflect at all the view of bankers on their own role. Nor does it reflect the way in which society experiences their existence. Even with perfect information, the time and risk preferences of savers and investors fail to be matched completely by the price (interest rate) mechanism: there are (too many) missing markets. It is the financial intermediary that somehow has to make do with these missing links. The financial intermediary manages risks in order to allow for the activities of other types of households within the economy.One would expect that the theory of the firm would pay ample attention to the driving forces behind entrepreneurial activity and could thus explain in more general terms the existence of financial intermedia tion as an entrepreneurial 24Critical Assessment activity. However, this is not the focus of that theory. The theory of the firm is preoccupied with the functioning of the corporate enterprise in the context of market structures and competition processes.In the wake of Coase (1937), the corporate enterprise is part of the market structure and can even be considered as an alternative for the market. This view laid the foundation for the transaction cost theory (see Williamson, 1988), for the agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and for the theory of asymmetric information (see Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981 and 1983). Essential in the approaches of these theories is that the corporate enterprise is not treated as a â€Å"black box†, a uniform entity, as was the case in the traditional micro-economic theory of the firm.It is regarded as a coalition of interests operating as a market by itself and optimizing the opposing and often conflicting interests of different stakeholders (clients, personnel, financiers, management, public authorities, non-governmental organizations). The rationale of the corporate enterprise is that it creates goods and services, which cannot be produced, or only at a higher price, by consumers themselves. This exclusive function justifies transaction costs, which are seen as a form of market imperfection.The mainstream theory of the firm evolved under the paradigm of the agency theory and the transaction costs theory as a theory of economic organization rather than as a theory of entrepreneurship. A separate line of thinking in the theory of the firm is the dynamic market approach of Schumpeter (1912), who stressed the essential function of entrepreneurs as innovators, creating new products and new distribution methods in order to gain competitive advantage in constantly developing and changing markets.In this approach, markets and enterprises are in a continuous process of â€Å"creative destruction† and the entrepreneurial function is pre-eminently dynamic. Basic inventions are more or less exogenous to the economic system; their supply is perhaps influenced by market demand in some way, but their genesis lies outside the existing market structure. Entrepreneurs seize upon these basic inventions and transform them into economic innovations. The successful innovators reap large short-term profits, which are soon bid away by imitators.The effect of the innovations is to disequilibrate and to alter the existing market structure, until the process eventually settles down in wait for the next (wave of) innovation. The result is a punctuated pattern of economic development that is perceived as a series of business cycles. Financial intermediaries, the ones that mobilize savings, allocate capital, manage risk, ease transactions, and monitor firms, are essential for economic growth and development. That is what Joseph Schumpeter argued early in this century.Now there is evidence to support Schumpeter’ s view: financial services promote development (see King and Critical Assessment25 Levine, 1993; Benhabib and Spiegel, 2000; Arestis et al. , 2001; Wachtel, 2001). The conceptual link runs as follows: Intermediaries can promote growth by increasing the fraction of resources society saves and/or by improving the ways in which society allocates savings. Consider investments in firms. There are large research, legal, and organizational costs associated with such investment.These costs can include evaluating the firm, coordinating financing for the firm if more than one investor is involved, and monitoring managers. The costs might be prohibitive for any single investor, but an intermediary could perform these tasks for a group of investors and lower the costs per investor. So, by researching many firms and by allocating credit to the best ones, intermediaries can improve the allocation of society’s resources. Intermediaries can also diversify risks and exploit economies of scale .For example, a firm may want to fund a large project with high expected returns, but the investment may require a large lump-sum capital outlay. An individual investor may have neither the resources to finance the entire project nor the desire to devote a disproportionate part of savings to a single investment. Thus profitable opportunities can go unexploited without intermediaries to mobilize and allocate savings. Intermediaries do much more than passively decide whether to fund projects. They can initiate the creation and transformation of firms’ activities.Intermediaries also provide payment, settlement, clearing and netting services. Modern economies, replete with complex interactions, require secure mechanisms to settle transactions. Without these services, many activities would be impossible, and there would be less scope for specialization, with a corresponding loss in efficiency. In addition to improving resource allocation, financial intermediaries stimulate individ uals to save more efficiently by offering attractive instruments that combine attributes of depositing, investing and insuring.The securities most useful to entrepreneurs – equities, bonds, bills of exchange – may not have the exact liquidity, security, and risk characteristics savers desire. By offering attractive financial instruments to savers – deposits, insurance policies, mutual funds, and, especially, combinations thereof – intermediaries determine the fraction of resources that individuals save. Intermediaries affect both the quantity and the quality of society’s output devoted to productive activities. Intermediaries also tailor financial instruments to the needs of firms.Thus firms can issue, and savers can hold, financial instruments more attractive to their needs than if intermediaries did not exist. Innovations can also spur the development of financial services. Improvements in computers and communications have triggered financial inn ovations over the past 20 years. Perhaps, more important for developing countries, growth can increase the demand for financial services, sparking their adoption. 26Critical Assessment In translating these concepts to the world of financial intermediation, one ends up at the so-called functional perspective (see Merton, 1995a).The functions performed by the financial intermediaries are providing a transactions and payments system, a mechanism for the pooling of funds to undertake projects, ways and means to manage uncertainty and to control risk and provide price information. The key functions remain the same, the way they are conducted varies over time. This looks quite similar to what Bhattacharya and Thakor (1993) regard as the qualitative asset transformation operations of financial intermediaries, resulting from informational asymmetries.However, in our perspective, it is not a set of operations per se but the function of the intermediaries that gives way to their presence in t he real world. Of course, we are well aware of the fact that in the real-world the everyday performance of these different functions can be experienced by clients as – to quote Boot (2000) – †an annoying set of transactions†. The key functions of financial intermediaries are fairly stable over time. But the agents that are able and willing to perform them are not necessarily so. And neither are the focus and the instruments of the financial supervisors.An insurance company in 2000 is quite dissimilar in its products and distribution channels from one in 1990 or 1960. And a bank in Germany is quite different from one in the UK. Very different financial institutions and also very different financial services can be developed to provide the de facto function. Furthermore, we have witnessed waves of financial innovations, consider swaps, options, futures, warrants, asset backed securities, MTNs, NOW accounts, LBOs, MBOs and MBIs, ATMs, EFTPOS, and the distribut ion revolution leading to e-finance (e. . see Finnerty, 1992; Claessens et al. , 2000; Allen et al. , 2002). From this, financial institutions and markets increasingly are in part complementary and in part substitutes in providing the financial functions (see also Gorton and Pennacchi, 1992; Levine, 1997). Merton (1995a) suggests a path of the development of financial functions. Instead of a secular trend, away from intermediaries towards markets, he acknowledges a much more cyclical trend, moving back and forth between the two (see also Rajan and Zingales, 2000).Merton argues that although many financial products tend to move secularly from intermediaries to markets, the providers of a given function (i. e. the financial intermediaries themselves) tend to oscillate according to the product-migration and development cycle. Some products also move in the opposite direction, for example the mutual fund industry changed the composition of the portfolios of US households substantially, that is, from direct held stock to indirect investments via mutual funds (Barth et al. , 1997). In our view, this mutual Critical Assessment27 und revolution in the US – and elsewhere – is a typical example of the increasing role for intermediated finance in the modern economy. Thus, in our opinion, one should view the financial intermediaries from an evolutionary perspective. They perform a crucial economic function in all times and in all places. However, the form they have changes with time and place. Maybe once they were giants, dinosaurs so to say, in the US. Nowadays, they are no longer that powerful but they did not lose their key function, their economic niche.Instead, they evolved into much smaller and less visible types of business, just like the dinosaurs evolved into the much smaller omnipresent birds. Note that most of the theoretical and empirical literature actually refers to banks (as a particular form of financial intermediary) rather than to all finan cial institutions conducting financial intermediation services. However, the bank of the 21st century completely differs from the bank that operated in most of the 20th century. Both its on- and off-balance sheet activities show a qualitatively different composition.That is, away from purely interest related lending and borrowing business towards fee and provision based insurance-investment-advice-management business. At the same time, the traditional insurance, investment and pension funds enter the world of lending and financing. As such, financial institutions tend to become both more similar and more complex organisations. Thus, it appears that the traditional banking theories relate to the creation of loans and deposits by banks, whereas this increasingly becomes a smaller part of their business.This is not only because of the changing composition of their income structure (not only interest-related income but also fee-based income). Also it is the case because of the blurring borders between the operations of the different kinds of financial intermediaries. Therefore, we argue first that the loan and the deposit only are a means to an end – which is acknowledged both by the bank and the customer – and that the bank and the non-bank financial intermediary increasingly develop qualitatively different (financial) instruments to manage risks.Questioning whether informational asymmetry is the principal explanatory variable of the financial intermediation process – what we do – does not imply denial of the pivotal role information plays in the financial intermediation process. On the contrary, under the strong influence of modern communication technologies and of the worldwide liberalization of financial services, the character of the financial intermediation process is rapidly changing. This causes a – until now only relative – decrease in traditional 28Critical Assessment forms of financial intermediation, namely in on-balance sheet banking.But the counterpart of this process – the increasing role of the capital markets where savers and investors deal in marketable securities thanks to world wide real time information – would be completely unthinkable without the growing and innovating role of financial intermediaries (like investment banks, securities brokers, institutional investors, finance companies, investment funds, mergers and acquisition consultants, rating agencies, etc. ). They facilitate the entrepreneurial process, provide bridge finance and invent new financial instruments in order to bridge different risk preferences of market parties by means of derivatives.It would be a misconception to interpret the relatively declining role of traditional banks, from the perspective of the financial sector as a whole, as a general process of disintermediation. To the contrary, the increasing number of different types of intermediaries in the financial markets and their increasing importance as financial innovators point to a swelling process of intermediation. Banks reconfirm their positions as engineers and facilitators of capital market transactions.The result is a secular upward trend in the ratio of financial assets to real assets in all economies from the 1960s onwards (see Table 3). It appears that informational asymmetries are not well-integrated into a dynamic approach of the development of financial intermedation and innovation. Well-considered, information, and the ICT revolution, plays a paradoxical role in this process. The ICT revolution certainly has an excluding effect on intermediary functions in that it bridges informational gaps between savers and investors and facilitates them to deal directly in open markets.This function of ICT promotes the exchange of generally tradable, thus uniform products, and leads to the commoditizing of financial assets. But the ICT revolution provokes still another, and essentially just as revolutionary, effect , namely the customizing of financial products and services. Modern network systems and product software foster the development of ever more sophisticated, specific, finance and investment products, often embodying option-like structures on both contracting parties which are developed in specific deals, thus â€Å"tailor made†, and which are not tradable in open markets.Examples are specific financing and investment schemes (tax driven private equity deals), energy finance and transport finance projects, etc. They give competitive advantages to both contracting parties, who often are opposed to public knowledge of the specifics of the deal (especially when tax aspects are involved). So, general trading of these contracts is normally impossible and, above all, not aimed at. (But imitation after a certain time lag can seldom be prevented! Informational data (on stock prices, interest and exchange rates, commodity and energy prices, Critical Assessment29 macroeconomic data, etc. ) are always a key ingredient of these investment products and project finance constructions. In this respect, information is attracting a pivotal role in the intermediation function because it is mostly the intermediation industry, not the ultimate contract parties that develop these new products and services. The function of information in this process, however, differs widely from that in the present intermediation

Saturday, September 28, 2019

Primary education Essay

Education in its general sense is a form of learning in which the knowledge, skills, and habits of a group of people are transferred from one generation to the next through teaching, training, or research. Education frequently takes place under the guidance of others, but may also be autodidactic. Any experience that has a formative effect on the way one thinks, feels, or acts may be considered educational. A right to education has been recognized by some governments. At the global level, Article 13 of the United Nations’ 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Etymology Etymologically, the word â€Å"education† is derived from the Latin educatio from educo which is related to the homonym educo from e- and †duco . Type of education Education can take place in formal or informal educational settings. Formal education Systems of schooling involve institutionalized teaching and learning in relation to a curriculum, which itself is established according to a predetermined purpose of the schools in the system. Schools systems are sometimes also based on religions, giving them different curricula. Curriculum. In formal education, a curriculum is the set of courses and their content offered at a school or university. As an idea, curriculum stems from the Latin word for race course, referring to the course of deeds and experiences through which children grow to become mature adults. A curriculum is prescriptive, and is based on a more general syllabus which merely specifies what topics must be understood and to what level to achieve a particular grade or standard. An academic discipline is a branch of knowledge which is formally taught, either at the university–or via some other such method. Each discipline usually has several sub-disciplines or branches, and distinguishing lines are often both arbitrary and ambiguous. Examples of broad areas of academic disciplines include the natural sciences, mathematics, computer science, social sciences, humanities and applied sciences. Educational institutions may incorporate fine arts as part of K-12 grade curricula or within majors at colleges and universities as electives. The various types of fine arts are music, dance, and theater. Preschools The term preschool refers to a school for children who are not old enough to attend kindergarten. It is a nursery school. Preschool education is important because it can give a child the edge in a competitive world and education climate. While children who do not receive the fundamentals during their preschool years will be taught the alphabet, counting, shapes and colors and designs when they begin their formal education they will be behind the children who already possess that knowledge. The true purpose behind kindergarten is â€Å"to provide a child-centered, preschool curriculum for three to seven year old children that aimed at unfolding the child’s physical, intellectual, and moral nature with balanced emphasis on each of them. † This period of education is very important in the formative years of the child. Teachers with special skills and training are needed at this time to nurture the children to develop their potentials. Primary schools Primary education consists of the first 5–7 years of formal, structured education. In general, primary education consists of six or eight years of schooling starting at the age of five or six, although this varies between, and sometimes within, countries. Globally, around 89% of primary-age children are enrolled in primary education, and this proportion is rising. Under the Education For All programs driven by UNESCO, most countries have committed to achieving universal enrollment in primary education by 2015, and in many countries, it is compulsory for children to receive primary education. The division between primary and secondary education is somewhat arbitrary, but it generally occurs at about eleven or twelve years of age. Some education systems have separate middle schools, with the transition to the final stage of secondary education taking place at around the age of fourteen. Schools that provide primary education, are mostly referred to as primary schools. Primary schools in these countries are often subdivided into infant schools and junior school. In India, compulsory education spans over twelve years, out of which children receive elementary education for 8 years. Elementary schooling consists of five years of primary schooling and 3 years of upper primary schooling. Various states in the republic of India provide 12 years of compulsory school education based on national curriculum framework designed by the National Council of Educational Research and Training. Secondary schools In most contemporary educational systems of the world, secondary education comprises the formal education that occurs during adolescence. It is characterized by transition from the typically compulsory, comprehensive primary education for minors, to the optional, selective tertiary, â€Å"post-secondary†, or â€Å"higher† education for adults. Depending on the system, schools for this period, or a part of it, may be called secondary or high schools, gymnasiums, lyceums, middle schools, colleges, or vocational schools. The exact meaning of any of these terms varies from one system to another. The exact boundary between primary and secondary education also varies from country to country and even within them, but is generally around the seventh to the tenth year of schooling. Secondary education occurs mainly during the teenage years. In the United States, Canada and Australia primary and secondary education together are sometimes referred to as K-12 education, and in New Zealand Year 1–13 is used. The purpose of secondary education can be to give common knowledge, to prepare for higher education or to train directly in a profession. The emergence of secondary education in the United States did not happen until 1910, caused by the rise in big businesses and technological advances in factories, that required skilled workers. In order to meet this new job demand, high schools were created, with a curriculum focused on practical job skills that would better prepare students for white collar or skilled blue collar work. This proved to be beneficial for both employers and employees, for the improvement in human capital caused employees to become more efficient, which lowered costs for the employer, and skilled employees received a higher wage than employees with just primary educational attainment. In Europe, grammar schools or academies date from as early as the 16th century, in the form of public schools, fee-paying schools, or charitable educational foundations, which themselves have an even longer history. Alternative Alternative education, also known as non-traditional education or educational alternative, is a broad term that may be used to refer to all forms of education outside of traditional education . This may include not only forms of education designed for students with special needs, but also forms of education designed for a general audience and employing alternative educational philosophies and methods. Alternatives of the latter type are often the result of education reform and are rooted in various philosophies that are commonly fundamentally different from those of traditional compulsory education. While some have strong political, scholarly, or philosophical orientations, others are more informal associations of teachers and students dissatisfied with certain aspects of traditional education. These alternatives, which include charter schools, alternative schools, independent schools, homeschooling and autodidacticism vary, but often emphasize the value of small class size, close relationships between students and teachers, and a sense of community. Alternative education may also allow for independent learning and engaging class activities. Special. In the past, those who were disabled were often not eligible for public education. Children with disabilities were often educated by physicians or special tutors. These early physicians set the foundation for special education today. They focused on individualized instruction and functional skills. Special education was only provided to people with severe disabilities in its early years, but more recently it has been opened to anyone who has experienced difficulty learning. Vocational Vocational education is a form of education focused on direct and practical training for a specific trade or craft. Vocational education may come in the form of an apprenticeship or internship as well as institutions teaching courses such as carpentry, agriculture, engineering, medicine, architecture and the arts. Informal education Autodidacticism Autodidacticism is self-directed learning that is related to but different from informal learning. In a sense, autodidacticism is â€Å"learning on your own† or â€Å"by yourself†, and an autodidact is a self-teacher. Autodidacticism is a contemplative, absorbing process. Some autodidacts spend a great deal of time reviewing the resources of libraries and educational websites. One may become an autodidact at nearly any point in one’s life. While some may have been informed in a conventional manner in a particular field, they may choose to inform themselves in other, often unrelated areas. Notable autodidacts include Abraham Lincoln, Srinivasa Ramanujan, Michael Faraday, Charles Darwin, Thomas Alva Edison, Tadao Ando, George Bernard Shaw, Frank Zappa,and Leonardo da Vinci . Indigenous Indigenous education refers to the inclusion of indigenous knowledge, models, methods and content within formal and non-formal educational systems. Often in a post-colonial context, the growing recognition and use of indigenous education methods can be a response to the erosion and loss of indigenous knowledge and language through the processes of colonialism. Furthermore, it can enable indigenous communities to â€Å"reclaim and revalue their languages and cultures, and in so doing, improve the educational success of indigenous students. † Education through recreation The concept of education through recreation was first applied to childhood development in the 19th century. In the early 20th century, the concept was broadened to include young adults but the emphasis was on physical activities. L. P. Jacks, also an early proponent of lifelong learning, described education through recreation: â€Å"A master in the art of living draws no sharp distinction between his work and his play, his labour and his leisure, his mind and his body, his education and his recreation. He hardly knows which is which. He simply pursues his vision of excellence through whatever he is doing and leaves others to determine whether he is working or playing. To himself he always seems to be doing both. Enough for him that he does it well. † Education through recreation is the opportunity to learn in a seamless fashion through all of life’s activities. The concept has been revived by the University of Western Ontario to teach anatomy to medical students. Open education is fast growing to become the dominant form of education, for many reasons such as its efficiency and results compared to traditional methods. Cost of education has been an issue throughout history, and a major political issue in most countries today. Open education is generally significantly cheaper than traditional campus based learning and in many cases even free. Many large university institutions are now starting to offer free or almost free full courses such as Harvard, MIT and Berkeley teaming up to form edX Other universities offering open education are Stanford, Princeton, Duke, Johns Hopkins, Edinburgh, U. Penn, U. Michigan, U. Virginia, U. Washington, Caltech. It has been called the biggest change in the way we learn since the printing press. Many people despite favorable studies on effectiveness may still desire to choose traditional campus education for social and cultural reasons. The conventional merit system degree is currently not as common in open education as it is in campus universities. Although some open universities do already offer conventional degrees such as the Open University in the United Kingdom. Currently many of the major open education sources offer their own form of certificate. Due to the popularity of open education these new kind of academic certificates are gaining more respect and equal â€Å"academic value† to traditional degrees. Many open universities are working to have the ability to offer students standardized testing and traditional degrees and credentials. There has been a culture forming around distance learning for people who are looking to enjoy the shared social aspects that many people value in traditional on campus education that is not often directly offered from open education. Examples of this are people in open education forming study groups, meetups and movements such as UnCollege. Liberal arts colleges A liberal arts institution can be defined as a â€Å"college or university curriculum aimed at imparting broad general knowledge and developing general intellectual capacities, in contrast to a professional, vocational, or technical curriculum. † Although what is known today as the liberal arts college began in Europe, the term is more commonly associated with Universities in the United States. Community colleges A nonresidential junior college offering courses to people living in a particular area. Learning modalities There has been much interest in learning modalities and styles over the last two decades. The most commonly employed learning modalities are: Visual: learning based on observation and seeing what is being learned. Auditory: learning based on listening to instructions/information. Kinesthetic: learning based on movement, e. g. hands-on work and engaging in activities. Other commonly-employed modalities include musical, interpersonal, verbal, logical, and intrapersonal. Dunn and Dunn focused on identifying relevant stimuli that may influence learning and manipulating the school environment, at about the same time as Joseph Renzulli recommended varying teaching strategies. Howard Gardner identified a wide range of modalities in his Multiple Intelligences theories. The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator and Keirsey Temperament Sorter, based on the works of Jung, focus on understanding how people’s personality affects the way they interact personally, and how this affects the way individuals respond to each other within the learning environment. The work of David Kolb and Anthony Gregorc’s Type Delineator follows a similar but more simplified approach. Some theories propose that all individuals benefit from a variety of learning modalities, while others suggest that individuals may have preferred learning styles, learning more easily through visual or kinesthetic experiences. A consequence of the latter theory is that effective teaching should present a variety of teaching methods which cover all three learning modalities so that different students have equal opportunities to learn in a way that is effective for them. Guy Claxton has questioned the extent that learning styles such as VAK are helpful, particularly as they can have a tendency to label children and therefore restrict learning. Recent research has argued â€Å"there is no adequate evidence base to justify incorporating learning styles assessments into general educational practice. † Instruction Instruction is the facilitation of another’s learning. Instructors in primary and secondary institutions are often called teachers, and they direct the education of students and might draw on many subjects like reading, writing, mathematics, science and history. Instructors in post-secondary institutions might be called teachers, instructors, or professors, depending on the type of institution; and they primarily teach only their specific discipline.